The Relevance of Sustainability in the Port Sector

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Ports, as hubs of global trade, face increasing pressure to adopt sustainable practices to mitigate the environmental, economic and social impacts of their activities. These hubs must balance operational efficiency with environmental responsibility and social integration. It is a fact that port sustainability not only responds to current regulations but has become a key strategy for competitiveness in the global market.

Evolution of sustainability in the port sector:

  1. Early Industrialisation and Early Environmental Consequences: During the 19th century, the Industrial Revolution drove the growth of ports, but also their polluting effects on water and air, without environmental regulations to mitigate these impacts.
  2. Environmental Awareness and Emerging Regulations: In the mid-20th century, with the expansion of global trade, an environmental awareness emerged that revealed the need for regulations that would limit the impact of ports. The first initiatives were driven by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the 1970s with the MARPOL Convention regulating maritime pollution.
  1. Environmental Management Systems and International Certifications: In the 1990s, standards such as ISO 14001 were established, providing ports with a formal framework to minimise their environmental impacts while optimising their operations.
  2. Strategic Sustainability and Climate Change: In the 21st century, climate change and corporate social responsibility have prompted ports to adopt long-term sustainability strategies, promoted by initiatives such as the World Ports Climate Action Programme (WPCAP), which encourages emission reductions and the use of clean fuels.

The World Ports Sustainability Programme (WPSP), guided by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), seeks to integrate sustainable practices into the strategic plans of ports around the world. This platform promotes collaboration, innovation and knowledge transfer between ports, focusing on six priority areas: digitalisation, infrastructure, health and safety, environmental impact, social integration and climate energy.

Success stories and best practices:

  • Digitalisation for Operational Efficiency: Modern ports have integrated technologies such as ‘just-in-time’ arrival and port community systems (PCS) to improve the efficiency of cargo flows and reduce energy consumption.
  • Sustainable Infrastructure: Port infrastructure is evolving towards more sustainable designs, optimising navigation channels and adopting ecological dredging practices that reduce environmental impact.
  • Health and Safety in Port Operations: The implementation of high health and safety standards for workers and visitors protects local communities while maintaining an efficient and safe operation.
  • Environmental Footprint Reduction: Ports have invested in renewable energy technologies, such as solar panels and wind turbines, and adopted port cleaning systems that minimise the use of fossil fuels.
  • Linking with Local Communities: Employment and education programmes promote local development, creating an inclusive social and economic environment that strengthens the relationship between the port and the community.

Challenges and future prospects for sustainable ports:

The transition to port sustainability involves facing regulatory, technological and financial challenges. Investment in low-emission infrastructure, skills development and international cooperation will be essential for ports to adapt and thrive in a constantly evolving environment.

Sustainability standards not only enable ports to comply with global regulations but also represent a competitive advantage by positioning them as leaders in responsible trade. In an environment where sustainability is no longer optional, but imperative, ports that integrate advanced environmental, social and economic practices will ensure their relevance and resilience in global trade. Today, they are a clear commitment of the European Union.

Prevalent Probability and Universality of Risk in Marine Insurance: Commentary on Supreme Court Judgment (Plenary Session) No. 1130/2026 of 13 July

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Supreme Court, First Chamber (Plenary Session). Judgment No. 1130/2026, of 13 July. Appeal No. 9733/2021. Presiding Judge: His Excellency Mr Fernando Cerdá Albero. ROJ: STS 3135/2026. ECLI:ES:TS:2026:3135.

Facts

Millenium Trading Invest, S.A. had insured the tuna vessel Txori Urdin under a hull policy taken out with Royal & Sun Alliance, Mutua de Riesgo Marítimo and Mapfre. Initially, the cover included the Institute Fishing Vessel Clauses and the Institute Additional Perils Clauses for Hulls. However, following the loss of the vessel’s classification, the parties agreed to reduce the scope of the cover, limiting it to the former and, consequently, to a named perils system.

On 25 September 2015, the vessel sank as a result of a leak, the cause of which could never be determined. Several factors shaped the course of the legal proceedings: the weather and sea conditions were favourable; the incident occurred in broad daylight whilst the crew were on the alert due to the presence of schools of fish; neither the radar nor the sonar detected any objects in the water; and the depth at which the ship sank prevented any inspection of the wreck.

Commercial Court No. 1 of A Coruña dismissed the claim on the grounds that the insured had not demonstrated that the incident constituted a risk covered by the policy. The Provincial Court of Appeal overturned that decision, holding that the principle of universality of risk applied and finding the insurers’ evidence insufficient to prove that the risk was excluded.

The Plenary Session of the Supreme Court upholds the first ground of the extraordinary appeal on the grounds of a procedural irregularity, sets aside the appeal judgment and, ruling on the matter itself in accordance with Final Provision 16.7 of the Civil Procedure Act (LEC), upholds the judgment at first instance, without ruling on the four grounds of the appeal on points of law.

Fundamentals of Law

  1. Exceptional review of the assessment of the evidence

The judgment begins by reiterating a well-established principle: the assessment of evidence is a matter for the courts of first instance and does not, in principle, constitute a matter subject to review on appeal or by way of an extraordinary appeal on grounds of procedural irregularity.

However, it reiterates the principle already set out in Supreme Court Judgment 64/2026 regarding the exceptional circumstances in which the Supreme Court may review that assessment: where there is a manifest error of fact, or where the decision is the result of arbitrary or manifestly irrational reasoning and, as a result, infringes the right to effective judicial protection.

It is worth noting a point of immediate practical relevance set out in the judgment itself: Article 469(1)(4) of the Civil Procedure Act (LEC), the legal provision relied upon by the appellants, has now been repealed, and this procedure is currently set out in Article 477(5) of the LEC following the reform introduced by Royal Decree-Law 5/2023 of 28 June.

It then sets out the criteria that must guide the assessment of expert evidence in accordance with the rules of sound judgement: the expert’s qualifications; any circumstances that might compromise their objectivity; the methodology employed and its acceptance by peers within the scientific or professional community; the principle of the concurring majority; the manner in which the subject matter of the expert report is recognised in light of the spatial and temporal conditions under which it was carried out; and the internal consistency of the report. It also points out that these rules are breached, amongst other scenarios, when the court, in the absence of conflicting expert opinions, reaches conclusions on the basis of the evidence submitted that differ from those set out in those opinions.

  1. Probability of prevalence as the standard in civil proceedings

The most significant procedural contribution of the judgement is the assertion that civil proceedings do not require absolute certainty, but rather a preponderance of the evidence.

The Plenary Session criticises the Provincial Court for rejecting the insurers’ expert reports on the grounds that they were based on ‘mere conjecture and probabilities that cannot be regarded as proven’. The Chamber draws a clear distinction between conjecture and probability: whilst the former does not meet the standard of proof, the latter may do so when it constitutes the most probable explanation of the facts and there is no alternative hypothesis of similar strength.

In this case, having ruled out grounding and weather conditions, the only question was whether the leak could have been caused by the vessel colliding with a floating object adrift or with any derelict property. On this point, the only evidence available was the expert reports provided by the insurers, drawn up using physical calculations and computer modelling, which ruled out that hypothesis. The insured party did not submit any expert evidence nor did they offer an alternative, technically sound explanation.

The Court states that the inability to inspect the wreck is a factor that must be taken into account when assessing the expert report, as it affects the manner in which the subject matter is examined; however, it does not in itself justify the rejection of technically sound reports. If the Court of Appeal considered that they did not meet the standard of prevailing probability, it should have explained why. The Chamber adds a pertinent temporal nuance: what was relevant was not the condition of the vessel in the preceding months – as established by the technical inspections on which the appeal judgment was based – but its condition at the very moment the leak occurred.

  1. Universality and specificity of risk

It is here that the judgement makes its most significant contribution to maritime insurance law.

The Court begins with an overview of the historical development of the principle of universality of risk. It points out that both Article 861(I) of the 1829 Commercial Code, in referring ‘generally to all accidents and risks at sea’, and Article 755(I)(14) of the current Code, which mentions ‘any other accidents or risks at sea’, used an open-ended clause that allowed all risks at sea not expressly excluded to be understood as included. It is from this historical formulation that the well-known principle derives, according to which risks not excluded must be deemed to be included.

However, the Plenary Session clarifies that this principle was never a rule concerning the burden of proof, but rather a substantive rule intended to determine the scope of cover where the contract did not expressly define the insured risks.

The Maritime Navigation Act maintains this principle solely on a supplementary basis. Articles 407.1, 417 and 429 are based on the freedom of contract, such that it is the parties who determine the risks covered, as emphasised in Section X of the preamble, which states that the insured risks are defined by agreement. Where the policy incorporates named-risk clauses, such as the Institute Fishing Vessel Clauses, the principle of universality ceases to apply and the cover is defined exclusively by the contract. The Chamber itself reserves a residual role for the principle: it would retain some significance, if at all, in relation to unknown risks not mentioned either in the list of included risks or in that of excluded risks.

The judgement adds a clarification of considerable interest: it reviews previous case-law on the principle of universality of risk and concludes that none of the decisions traditionally cited actually based their ratio decidendi on that principle, nor did they attribute any effects to it in relation to the burden of proof. In doing so, the Plenary Session definitively restores the principle to its original function as a historical and supplementary rule for defining the scope of cover.

Applying that doctrine to the case, the Court concludes that the insured proved that the vessel had sunk, but not that this was due to any of the risks expressly covered by clause 6 of the policy; consequently, the insured failed to prove the fact constituting the basis of their claim in accordance with Article 217(2) of the LEC.

  1. Conclusion

Supreme Court Ruling 1130/2026 goes well beyond the scope of marine insurance. Together with Supreme Court Rulings 9/2026 and 64/2026, it establishes the ‘prevailing probability’ as the general standard in civil proceedings and defines more precisely the scope of judicial review of expert evidence. It will be difficult to reject a technically sound expert opinion on the mere grounds that it is expressed in probabilistic terms where there is no alternative hypothesis of comparable weight.

At the same time, it redefines the scope of the principle of universal cover under the Maritime Navigation Act, noting that its function is purely supplementary and that, where the parties have opted for a system of named risks, it is the contract itself – and not a general clause of cover – that determines the scope of the insurance cover.

The MSC Flaminia Case and the Interpretation of the 1976 LLMC Convention

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Maritime transport is an essential element of international trade and, at the same time, a high-risk activity capable of generating liabilities of great economic magnitude. To prevent an accident from compromising the financial continuity of maritime operators and paralysing trade, international maritime law developed specific mechanisms for limiting liability, including the Convention of 19 November 1976 on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (hereinafter LLMC).

Due to its particular relevance, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom of 9 April 2025, MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA v Conti 11 Container Schiffahrts-GmbH & Co KG (MS “MSC Flaminia”), in which the court conducts a detailed examination of various provisions relating to the limitation of liability set out in the 1976 LLMC Convention.

The conflict dates back to July 2012, when the container ship MSC Flaminia suffered a devastating explosion at sea due to dangerous cargo. The accident killed three crew members and left the ship severely damaged, with thousands of tonnes of contaminated water and toxic waste on board. The cargo being transported did not fare any better, which led to various legal proceedings being initiated in the Southern District Court of New York.

For its part, after lengthy arbitration proceedings, the charterer, MSC, was ordered to compensate the shipowner, Conti, for damages and expenses arising from the accident in the amount of approximately $200 million. MSC then attempted to limit its liability to approximately £28 million, invoking the 1976 LLMC Convention.

This latest legal controversy, which has attracted the attention of the entire maritime sector since then, focused on the question of who is entitled to this legal ‘shield’ under Article 1.2 of the Convention, which groups under the definition of ‘shipowner’ not only the registered owner, but also the charterer, manager and operator of the ship. In legal terms, these figures are known as ‘insiders’ because they share a common interest in the operation of the vessel. The Court of Appeal held that the limitation of liability only applied to ‘outsiders’ (third parties, such as cargo owners or authorities), suggesting that a charterer could not protect itself against a claim by the shipowner for losses originally suffered by the shipowner. This interpretation introduced a distinction not expressly provided for in the text of the Convention, which was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court.

In a landmark ruling, the UK Supreme Court held (in line with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Articles 31 to 33) that the LLMC Convention must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, without introducing exceptions not provided for in its text.

The Supreme Court determined that the term ‘claims’ appearing in Articles 1.1 and 2.1 of the Convention should be understood without distinguishing between who files the claim or against whom it is directed. The court rejected the idea of applying a restrictive interpretation to the original text simply because the claimant is the owner of the vessel. According to the Court, if the Convention does not explicitly provide for an exception for disputes between ‘insiders’, the courts should not invent one. Article 1.2 defines the owner, charterer, manager and operator as ‘shipowners’ of equal rank, without suggesting any differential treatment between them.

The ruling also clarified what types of claims are subject to limitation. The Court reaffirmed an established doctrine: direct damage to the ship is not subject to limitation. However, in this specific case, the Supreme Court considered that the costs of unloading and decontaminating the cargo claimed did fall under Article 2.1(e) of the Convention as argued by MSC and were therefore limitable, even though the unloading of the goods was also necessary in order to proceed with the repair of the vessel. It was thus established that, if a claim falls within the description of the limitation cases provided for in Article 2.1, it does not lose its limitable nature merely because the claim may be consequential to damage suffered by the ship.

In short, the analysed Supreme Court ruling helps to clarify the application of the 1976 LLMC Convention by ruling out the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsider’. This reinforces the uniform application of liability limitation rules applicable to all shipowners, strengthening their role as a pillar of commercial stability. For insurers, shipowners and logistics operators, the ruling provides predictability in relation to exposure to claims arising from maritime accidents, even when these involve the owner, charterer, manager or operator of the vessel.

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October 2026: The Digitalisation of Land Transport Begins

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The road transport sector, which has for years been calling for innovation and improvements, both to optimise operations and to enhance the quality of life of its workers, is now driving transformation across a wide range of areas. Promoting more sustainable vehicle fleets, regulating autonomous vehicles and ensuring more efficient and safer monitoring of road transport are now among the top priorities in Europe and Spain, whilst at the same time presenting new challenges in the regulatory sphere.

In line with this roadmap, the legal framework set out in Regulation (EU) 2020/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 on electronic freight transport information (eFTI), designed to facilitate the electronic communication of regulatory information relating to the carriage of goods within the territory of the European Union.

The eFTI Regulation sets out rules for the electronic sharing of freight transport information between businesses and authorities, without requiring a specific document, but rather a common method of accessing the shared data. Furthermore, the aim of this systematisation is to ensure that all information is reliable and verifiable, with guarantees of authenticity, integrity, traceability and clarity, whilst minimising delays caused by paperwork and redundant or avoidable administrative procedures.

Digitisation of the Administrative Control Document (DeCA)

Act 9/2025 of 3 October on Sustainable Mobility (published in the Official State Gazette No. 291 of 4 December 2025, and in force since 5 December 2025), stems from the aforementioned European regulation, and one of its aims is to facilitate the establishment of an efficient, sustainable and resilient multimodal freight transport system, harnessing the potential of digitalisation and technology.

In its eighth transitional provision, concerning the digitisation of the administrative control document required for the provision of public road haulage services and the journey log required for the provision of public road passenger transport services, it states that the administrative control document must be in digital form within ten months of the law coming into force. It is worth remembering that this document must be issued for all public goods transport, except in certain specific cases such as removals or light parcel deliveries, amongst others.

Therefore, the administrative control document must be in digital format from 5 October 2026(although it appears that some companies and self-employed workers have already been using it on a voluntary basis since mid-2025, in order to gradually adapt to electronic systems).

The requirements and characteristics that administrative control documents must meet, in their capacity as a mandatory administrative record accompanying goods transported by road and containing details of the shipper, the carrier and the vehicle, as well as the date, the origin and destination of the load, the characteristics of the goods or any observations to be included, are already regulated by Order FOM/2861/2012 of 13 October (amended by Order TRM/282/2026 of 25 March). This Order is supplemented by the Resolution of 22 May 2023 issued by the Directorate-General for Land Transport, which sets out the specific requirements for the electronic version of that document (DeCA).

A document that incorporates the details of the consignment note and the CMR contract, as set out in Article 2.2 of the aforementioned Order FOM/2861/2012: “2. In cases where the transport is documented in a consignment note or other supporting documentation in accordance with the relevant national, European Union or international legislation in force, this shall serve as an administrative control document provided that it contains all the information set out in Article 6 of this Order.”

Order FOM/2861/2012 also states that the contractual shipper and the actual carrier are responsible for ensuring that the control document exists and is correctly completed, as well as for the obligation to carry it in the vehicle. According to the document, the shipper was responsible for data relating to the cargo and the contract, whilst the carrier was responsible for information relating to the performance of the transport. However, following the amendments introduced by the recent Order TRM/282/2026 of 5 March (Article 2), responsibility for ensuring that the control document exists and is correctly issued is now shared between shippers and carriers. Although Order TRM/282/2026 does not specify who is responsible for producing it, it does confirm that both parties will be jointly and severally liable if the document is missing or contains errors.

In any case, regardless of who issued it, the document must be available in digital format before the vehicle leaves its point of origin.

Electronic Consignment Note (eCDP) and Digital CMR (eCMR)

Digital consignment notes or CMR contracts are the electronic version of the paper document that supports the transport of goods by road (domestic or international) agreed between the shipper and the carrier, and their main purpose remains to prove the existence of a transport contract (and its terms and conditions), as well as the carrier’s receipt of the goods. Although their digitisation is not yet mandatory, this is also a feasible option given their link to the administrative control document.

In fact, a domestic consignment note must include the minimum information required by law, as set out in Article 10 of Law 15/2009 of 11 November on contracts for the carriage of goods by land; similarly, the content of a CMR contract must meet certain minimum requirements under the CMR Convention for international transport (Article 6). However, this does not prevent them from including the information required for the administrative control document (Article 6 of Order FOM/2861/2012), thereby facilitating the issuance of a single digital document that complies with the parameters and requirements for the carriage of goods by road.

Conclusions

Among the most significant improvements expected to result from the proposed document digitisation project are key aspects such as:

  • To facilitate administrative inspections of transport operations.
  • To assist interested parties in issuing and obtaining copies of transport-related documents.
  • To ensure security by guaranteeing that documents (reports, terms and conditions, cargo details, reservations or ‘remarks’, etc.) cannot be altered.
  • To facilitate real-time monitoring of transport.
  • Enable modifications to be made during transport.
  • To streamline the service billing processes.
  • Reduce administrative costs.
  • To obtain reliable and accurate evidence for use in legal proceedings.
  • Facilitate the claims process.

Undoubtedly, the ultimate aim is to improve efficiency and traceability, but this will also require strict compliance with data protection and confidentiality regulations, as the information shared must be underpinned by an ecosystem of certified and interoperable platforms.

Focusing on our sector, it is worth noting that this approach also aims to facilitate the resolution of disputes between carriers and shippers, thanks to its immutability and digital security. We must not forget that, in any claim or incident arising in the context of a road transport contract, the admissibility of evidence is an essential and decisive factor in the defence of the positions of the parties involved.

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The Strait of Hormuz Under International Law: Sovereignty and Freedom of Navigation in Conflict

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Author: Verónica Meana Larrucea / AIYON ABOGADOS S.L.P.

The Strait of Hormuz has once again taken centre stage in the international maritime legal debate. Since the outbreak of the conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran on 28 February 2026, Tehran has been progressively tightening its control over transit through the area, imposing prior authorisation requirements, selective restrictions and transit fees on certain vessels. The escalation intensified from 13 April onwards, when the United States launched Operation Epic Fury, which involves coercive naval actions against vessels linked to Iran and has led to the mass diversion of commercial traffic and the immobilisation of several Iranian oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman.

The strategic importance of the strait is beyond question: approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil and a substantial proportion of liquefied natural gas pass through it every day. Any disruption to this vital artery has immediate consequences for energy markets, maritime transport and global trade. But beyond the geopolitical dimension, the conflict raises a legal controversy of the first order regarding the limits of state control in international straits and the scope of the principle of freedom of navigation.

The relevant legal framework is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Montego Bay, 1982), which distinguishes between the regime of innocent passage—applicable to territorial waters and granting the coastal State a wider scope of control—and the special regime of transit passage set out in Articles 37 to 44 for certain international straits. The latter recognises a right of continuous and expeditious transit which coastal States may not impede or suspend.

Iran maintains that the context of armed conflict entitles it to adopt control measures comparable to the regime of innocent passage. The majority of the international community argues, on the basis of Article 44 of UNCLOS, that the special regime of transit passage applies to the Strait of Hormuz, which precludes the imposition of prior authorisations or general restrictions on maritime traffic.

The dispute also involves a legal paradox of considerable significance: neither the United States nor Iran has ratified UNCLOS. Washington, on the one hand, considers that its fundamental provisions form part of customary international law and are therefore binding even on non-party states. Iran, on the other hand, invokes the doctrine of the persistent objector: having expressed constant and systematic opposition to the regime of transit passage since the very negotiations of the Convention, it denies that this regime is enforceable against it as a rule of customary law.

However, a significant body of legal scholarship holds that the freedom of navigation through international straits existed even before UNCLOS. In this regard, the International Court of Justice had already recognised in the Corfu Channel case (1949) the right of passage through international straits without prior authorisation from the coastal State, a principle it reaffirmed in Nicaragua v. United States (1986) by confirming that freedom of navigation remains in force as a customary rule regardless of its subsequent codification in treaties. However, the Corfu judgment also established a key limitation: unilateral actions by a State in foreign waters — in that case, the Royal Navy’s mine clearance in Albanian waters — infringe upon the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State even if carried out in the name of freedom of navigation. That unresolved tension between sovereignty and freedom of passage remains at the heart of the problem in the Strait of Hormuz today.

Two further issues merit attention in this dispute. Firstly, Iran’s proposal to impose tolls on maritime transit is in direct conflict with Article 26 of UNCLOS, which prohibits the imposition of charges for the mere passage of vessels, except where such charges are in return for services actually rendered to the vessel. Unlike artificial canals such as Suez or Panama, the Strait of Hormuz is a natural strait whose legal regime is based on freedom of transit. Oman, also a coastal State and a party to UNCLOS, has publicly rejected this possibility.

Secondly, and conversely, Article 39 of UNCLOS imposes on ships in transit themselves an obligation to refrain from any threat or use of force against coastal States, a particularly sensitive issue in light of the US naval operations currently underway.

The situation in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that international maritime law remains, ultimately, a delicate balance between state sovereignty and freedom of navigation. The dispute pits not merely two conflicting legal interpretations against one another, but two distinct conceptions of the limits of state control in one of the world’s most strategic maritime corridors. Its resolution — or its prolongation — will have consequences that extend far beyond the waters of the Persian Gulf.

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Enrique Ortiz Outlines the Legal Status of the Vessel “MV HONDIUS” in Light of the Serious Health Crisis Unfolding on Board

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We would like to thank the local media outlet “La Voz de Canarias” for turning to our firm to gather and report on the situation regarding the vessel “MV HONDIUS,” which is currently conducting its evacuation operation from the port of Granadilla on the island of Tenerife.

Enrique Ortiz Bastos, our partner and colleague at the Cádiz office, provided a detailed response to the legal issues raised by the situation in the context of the law of the sea, the actions of public health authorities, and the division of responsibilities among institutions. Enrique thus emphasized the importance of implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which must, in this case, be applied in conjunction with the International Health Regulations of 2005  of the World Health Organization (WHO). He also emphasized the need for the various institutions and agencies involved to work very closely with the Captain in order to find the best solution to this serious situation.

The “Certificate of Free Practique” takes on particular importance in this scenario; we discussed this certificate in our October 2021 article, “Impact of COVID-19 on Ship Operations in Spanish Ports” when we were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This certificate consists of a sworn statement made by the ship’s captain regarding the health situation on board. In any case, however, the final decision on whether to authorize the ship’s entry into port will always rest with the Ministry of Health, through the Foreign Health Service, acting in coordination with the Tenerife Port Authority.

Our partner emphasized that the flag state would not bear direct responsibility for the actions of the captain or the shipowners in the event of an epidemic or infection on board, although this does not preclude the captain and the shipowners from being held accountable for the statements they make and the actions and measures they take. Therefore, both parties could face administrative, civil, or criminal liability if they fail to provide the necessary information accurately, fail to comply with onboard protocols, or fail to cooperate with the relevant authorities, thereby minimizing the serious impact of the situation on their passengers, crew, and any third parties who may be affected.

1st Conference on Maritime Law – ELSA UPV/EHU

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We at AIYON Abogados are delighted to share news of our participation in the “1st Maritime Law Conference” organised by ELSA UPV/EHU, held on 5 and 6 May at the Naval Command in Bilbao and at the Sociedad Bilbaína.

Our partner Mikel Garteiz-goxeaskoa had the privilege of speaking as a panellist in the “Merchant Navy” session, addressing the basic rules of maritime safety, compliance monitoring by the authorities, and the penalty system. We hope that his presentation proved useful to those in attendance, particularly for those taking their first steps in the fascinating world of Maritime Law.

The conference covered topics such as security, the merchant navy, underwater cultural heritage, and so on. As Laura Almodóvar noted at the close of the event, maritime law is not an abstract concept but something that “permeates” reality, and specifically the day-to-day operations of the maritime and port sector and international trade.

Our heartfelt thanks go to the organisers for this initiative and for the trust placed in us by Laura Almodóvar Cobo and Joritz García Pérez, president and vice-president of ELSA UPV/EHU, as well as to their team, to whom we offer our sincerest congratulations for their hard work and dedication, which have produced this magnificent result. Given the large audience in attendance and the quality of the programme on offer, with much still to be discussed and developed, we hope that these conferences will continue for many years to come.

Thank you, too, to all the distinguished speakers for their excellent presentations:

  • CN Tomás García-Figueras – Bilbao Naval Command
  • Commander Justo Solano García – Spanish Navy
  • Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Cantero Álvarez – Civil Guard
  • Prof. José Manuel Martín-Osante – Professor of Commercial Law, UPV/EHU
  • Pilar del Campo Hernán – Historical Archive of the Spanish Navy
  • Xabier Armendáriz – Maritime historian
  • Prof. Mariano J. Aznar Gómez – Professor of International Law, Jaume I University
  • Julio Carlos Fuentes Gómez – Deputy Director-General for Maritime Regulations, Directorate-General for the Merchant Navy
  • Miller Wells – Global Factors
  • José María Pedrosa – Director, Howden Pesca Norte
  • Prof. Iñaki Zurutuza Arigita – Public University of Navarre

Nor should we forget the partners who made this conference possible, including: the Sociedad Bilbaína, the Spanish Navy, the University of the Basque Country / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, the Royal Spanish Naval League, Cepesca – the Spanish Fishing Confederation, Howden, the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, the ERDF and the State Research Agency.

The sea has much to teach us, and the law has much to say about it.

See you at the “2nd Maritime Law Conference”!

Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004 and the concept of “extraordinary circumstances” in air transport

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The General Court of the European Union – Judgment in Case T- 134/25 of January 21, 2026 addresses several key issues related to Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004, particularly with regard to the concept of “extraordinary circumstances” and how to analyze complex delays in air transport.

Beyond the specific case, the ruling introduces a more technical view of how air transport actually works, attempting to balance passenger protection with the operational reality of airlines.

As we know, Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004 ensures that passengers receive compensation when their flights are significantly disrupted, such as denied boarding, cancellations, or long delays. However, airlines may be exempt if they can prove that the cause was an “extraordinary circumstance,”understood as an event beyond their control that could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. Such circumstances may arise, in particular, in cases of political instability, weather conditions incompatible with the flight, safety risks, unexpected flight safety deficiencies, or strikes affecting the operations of an air carrier (provided that they are beyond its effective control and were not foreseeable).

This is stated in the GCEU ruling itself: “[…] the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No. 261/2004 must be interpreted strictly, and the cumulative requirements that must be met for events to be considered ‘extraordinary circumstances’ must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.”

Similarly, Article 5.3 of the aforementioned European Regulation states that an air carrier is not obliged to pay compensation if it can prove that the cancellation is due to “extraordinary circumstances”that could not have been avoided, even if it had taken all reasonable measures within its power. This article has generated numerous legal disputes regarding the definition and scope of these alleged circumstances, which an airline may use to exonerate itself and which passengers generally do not have access to.

Now, the European Court recognizes in its ruling that certain decisions by air traffic control bodies may indeed constitute “extraordinary circumstances.” This means that delays caused by factors beyond the airline’s control, such as operational restrictions imposed by air traffic controllers, may exempt it from liability, provided that they are beyond its effective control and there is no negligence on the part of the carrier. Therefore, if a delay is due to the airline’s internal planning or failures, the exemption does not apply.

In situations where a flight is delayed for various reasons, the ruling allows for separating and analyzing which part is due to an extraordinary event. If a partial delay is due to a justified external cause, only the remainder may be considered when calculating compensation. The ruling accepts that delays caused by problems occurring on previous flights of the same aircraft may be considered “extraordinary circumstances,” provided there is a direct causal link with the final delay, thus allowing the entire context of the operation to be assessed.

This resolution has important implications in that it provides legal certainty by offering guidelines on how to assess specific cases. By defining such an ambiguous concept as “extraordinary circumstances,” the      GCEU ruling of January 21, 2026, represents a significant jurisprudential advance in establishing a more balanced and realistic framework for the relationship between airlines and passengers in the air transport sector.

Containers Lost at Sea: New Regulations Following Amendments to the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions

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On 1 January 2026, the new mandatory international regime, adopted within the framework of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), came into force, making the reporting of containers lost at sea or sighted adrift a specific and standardised obligation.

The reform, which is implemented through amendments to the SOLAS Convention (Chapter V, Safety of Navigation) and corresponding adjustments to MARPOL Protocol I (reports of incidents that may lead to pollution), aims to close a long-standing gap: the existence of general ‘hazard warning’ obligations, but without a uniform definition for the ‘container case’.

The underlying purpose of the reform is twofold. On the one hand, it promotes the effective mitigation of the risk of collision, as semi-submerged or drifting containers pose a clear danger to shipping. Secondly, the aim is to reduce environmental damage and improve the traceability and/or recovery of lost packages, thereby facilitating the development of early response protocols by coastal authorities, SAR (Search and Rescue) services, and operators in the affected areas.

In its latest report, the World Shipping Council (WSC) reported a total of 576 containers lost at sea during 2024 (1), a relatively modest figure given the average for the last decade – 1,274 – particularly when considering the true quantitative scale of the containerised shipping sector in that same year, which ultimately resulted in an estimated 250 million 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs) being transported.

However, it would be a mistake to dismiss these losses as mere logistical incidents; these events have been shown to have a growing legal and operational impact on matters of the utmost importance to the global maritime community and international maritime law: the safety of navigation and the protection of the marine environment.

As we mentioned, from a quantitative perspective, the figures reveal a paradox that clearly explains why the regulator should intervene actively: the phenomenon is statistically insignificant in relation to the total volume transported, but it is critical due to its potential severity.

The most high-profile incidents of recent years clearly illustrate the situations that the reform aims to address by introducing a standard framework for reporting them. In 2024, a cluster of losses was observed on routes particularly exposed to storms, against a backdrop of diversions to the Cape of Good Hope following the security crisis in the Red Sea and attacks on commercial shipping attributed to the Houthis: the “CMA CGM BELEM” reported the loss of up to 99 containers off Richards Bay (ZA) in August 2024, and the “CMA CGM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN” reported the loss of 44 containers in July 2024 whilst sailing in adverse weather conditions in the aforementioned area.

In addition to these more frequent incidents, there have been events which, due to their scale or impact, have had a greater influence on the debate: losses near the coast resulting in goods washing up on beaches and the subsequent public order issues – such as the “EVER LUNAR” in Callao (2025) – massive cargo collapses on the high seas – the “ONE Apus” (2020) – or incidents in which containerised cargo has become a source of severe pollution, such as the “X-PRESS PEARL” (2021).

Taken together, these events have highlighted the need to establish uniform and effective international standards: the speed and quality of reporting determine the effectiveness of navigational warnings, the coordination of the onshore response, and the traceability of the incident – precisely the shortcomings that the amendments to SOLAS and MARPOL Protocol I seek to address.

Legal basis: SOLAS Chapter V and MARPOL Protocol I:

The amendment is incorporated into SOLAS  Chapter V (“Safety of Navigation”), through amendments to Regulations V/31 and V/32 (“Danger Messages”) and, in parallel, clarifications are introduced in MARPOL Protocol I – to harmonise the flow of information when a lost container may contain harmful/polluting substances, avoiding duplication and ensuring consistency between the navigation (SOLAS) and environmental (MARPOL) perspectives.

The adoption is implemented, amongst other things, through Resolution MSC.550(108) (2) for SOLAS, and Resolution MEPC.384(81) (3) for the associated amendments to MARPOL Protocol I.

Through this regulatory approach, the amendment reinforces the mandatory, verifiable and enforceable nature of the notification: it ceases to be a discretionary or merely ‘recommended’ practice and becomes an integral part of the safety standards required by flag States and Port State Control (PSC) authorities.

Obligated parties and factual circumstances, loss and sighting:

Liability is not limited to the vessel that loses containers. The new regulatory framework provides for two scenarios:

a) Vessel involved in the loss: The master is required to report the loss of one or more containers without delay. The report must be addressed to:

  • vessels in the vicinity,
  • the authority of the State whose coastline is nearest,
  • the flag State.

b) Observer vessel (sighting): If a vessel has not suffered any loss but observes containers adrift, the master must report the sighting, also without delay and “to the greatest extent possible”, at least to other vessels in the area and to the nearest coastal State.

c) Situation where the master is unable to fulfil the obligation: The amendment expressly provides for a fallback arrangement: if the ship is abandoned or the master is unable to carry out the ‘reporting’ – for example, in emergency situations – the obligation would pass to the company in accordance with ISM/SOLAS IX – the company. This is significant, as it makes the notification an organisational obligation of the shipping companies/shipowners, rather than purely an individual obligation of the master and/or the ship.

Minimum content of the notification, standardisation and traceability:

One of the key changes is the standardisation of the content of the ‘danger message’. The notification must include:

–    Identification of the vessel.

–    Date/time and position of the loss or sighting.

–    Number of containers involved and, where known, a description of them.

–  Details of dangerous goods and, where applicable, references such as UN numbers or other information relevant to risk management.

–   Circumstances of the incident and relevant details, such as weather conditions and sea state.

Furthermore, the system is designed to operate on a ‘progressive’ basis: if not all the information is available at the outset (e.g. verification of the declared cargo or confirmation of the exact number), an immediate initial report is expected, followed by subsequent updates, culminating in a final verified report once the details have been confirmed.

Institutional data flow from the ship to the IMO’s Global Integrated Maritime Information System (GISIS)

The reform does not stop at issuing warnings; the amendments introduce an additional layer of transparency: flag States must report confirmed losses to the IMO’s GISIS system, thereby creating a global repository of incidents to facilitate trend analysis and traceability, with the further aim of strengthening cross-border cooperation.

From a public law perspective, this establishes a strengthened framework of ‘duty of care’: it is not enough to simply ‘manage the incident internally’; there is a requirement for a formal notification to specific recipients, and an institutional framework that enables mitigation measures (navigational warnings, coordination on land, and any search and rescue operations).

Implications of compliance, ISM audits and potential liability cases:

In terms of compliance, this new obligation has a direct impact on:

a) Safety Management System (SMS/ISM): The reporting obligation must be translated into internal procedures, checklists, specific training programmes and the allocation of responsibilities (master/CSO/company), including communication channels, ‘danger message’ templates and the retention of evidence for this purpose. The provision for substitution by the company when the captain is unable to report similarly reinforces the need for documentary and operational governance.

b) Evidence and traceability of the incident: Early notification and subsequent verification are linked to the need to:

  • maintain bridge records (VDR where applicable),
  • ensure consistency with the manifest and stowage plan, and
  • coordinate with terminals, shippers and insurers. Standardisation makes it easier to compare ‘what should have been done’ with ‘what was actually done’, which increases the risk of criticism for omitting information or delays in its submission.

c) Civil and administrative liability (cross-cutting risk): Although the reform is primarily aimed at promoting safety and care for the marine environment, failure to comply with it may lead to a cascade of adverse effects:

  • If a drifting container causes collision damage, failure to report the incident could exacerbate allegations of negligence.
  • In the event of pollution or a spill of hazardous goods, the link to MARPOL Protocol I reinforces the duty to report in order to facilitate the response and containment efforts.
  • From an insurance perspective (P&I/hull/cargo), the traceability of the report may influence discussions regarding coverage, damage mitigation and cooperation with the authorities.

 Some final thoughts

The entry into force of the new IMO framework for the proper reporting of containers lost at sea marks a significant shift: the loss of containers is no longer treated as a manageable operational by-product to be dealt with on a ‘case-by-case’ basis, but is now classified as a specific incident requiring immediate reporting, with designated recipients, standardised minimum content requirements and institutional traceability (GISIS).

In practice, this will require shipping companies, shipowners, commercial operators and ISM companies to integrate the reporting processes into their SMS systems, to train and update their crews accordingly, and to ensure that communication channels and document verification procedures are in place.

The logic is clear: the faster and more consistent the flow of information, the greater the capacity of the international maritime system – ships, operators, coastal states and flag states – to reduce navigation risks and minimise the potential negative environmental impacts arising from lost containers.

(1) World Shipping Council, Containers Lost at Sea. 2025 Update, junio de 2025, p. 3.

(2) RESOLUTION MSC.550(108) (adopted on 23 May 2024) AMENDMENTS TO CHAPTERS II-2 AND V OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1974.

(3) RESOLUTION MEPC.384(81) (adopted on 22 March 2024) AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION FROM SHIPS, 1973, AS MODIFIED BY THE PROTOCOL OF 1978 RELATING THERETO Amendments to Protocol I of MARPOL (Reporting procedures for the loss of containers).

Supreme Court Ruling 173/2026, of 5 February: Expiry of the Time Limit in Article 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules and Limits on the Scope of Case Law Doctrine

/in , /by

The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, sitting in plenary session, handed down Judgment No. 173/2026 of 5 February (rec. 8008/2021), resolving the controversy over the legal nature of the one-year time limit for bringing liability proceedings against the carrier in international maritime transport of goods under a bill of lading following the entry into force of the Maritime Navigation Act of 2014 (hereinafter MNA).

The ruling confirms established case law: the time limit set out in Article 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules (hereinafter, HVR) is a period of limitation that cannot be unilaterally interrupted.

However, the actual scope of that statement requires careful reading of the resolution.

I. Facts of the case and procedural history

The dispute arose from the maritime transport of pharmaceutical products from Valencia to Durban (South Africa). During the pre-loading phase, the refrigerated container was incorrectly reprogrammed, resulting in the irreversible destruction of the goods.

The loader filed a lawsuit in March 2017, after having made out-of-court claims in 2016.

The Commercial Court upheld the claim, considering Article 286 MNA applicable and understanding that the period had been interrupted. The Provincial Court overturned the ruling, finding that the claim had expired in accordance with Article 3.6 HVR. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld this latter conclusion.

II. The legal issue resolved: inapplicability of Article 286 MNA when transport is subject to HVR

The controversial issue was whether the entry into force of the MNA and, in particular, Article 286 thereof altered the legal nature of the annual period provided for in Article 3.6 HVR.

The Court’s answer is negative. When the transport contract is subject to the HVR, the regime applicable to the time limit is that of the international agreement itself.

The reasoning is based on two main ideas.

1.Prevalence of the applicable international regime

The ruling is based on the assumption that the defendant was subject to the HVR by virtue of its own Article 10, as it was an international transport under a bill of lading originating in a State Party. On that basis, the Court recalls that the MNA applies insofar as it does not conflict with international treaties in force in Spain (Article 2.1), and that Article 277.2 itself refers to the HVR as the applicable regulations governing the carrier’s liability in this type of contract.

Based on this approach, the Chamber concludes that Article 286 MNA is not applicable when the contract is subject to international agreement, whose regulatory precedence prevents an internal rule from altering the legal regime provided for in Article 3.6 HVR.

2.Continuity of case law and uniformity of interpretation

The second element of the reasoning is interpretative continuity. The Court recalls that the expiry nature of the time limit in Article 3.6 HVR constitutes established case law doctrine since the previous legislation came into force and that there are no reasons to modify it.

III. The argument for regulatory harmonisation and its limits

The ruling also invokes the coordination between national and international law proclaimed by the MNA. It could be interpreted that, in doing so, the Court is affirming that the nature of expiry must be maintained in general terms, regardless of the legal title under which the HVRs are applicable.

However, this conclusion does not necessarily follow from the resolution.

The argument of uniformity makes perfect sense when the international agreement operates as such and supersedes national law. However, this assumption does not necessarily apply when the HVR are not applicable by virtue of their own Article 10 and act solely by reference to Spanish law. In this context, the issue no longer lies in the primacy of international law, but rather in the interaction between domestic rules.

The ruling does not expressly address this scenario.

IV. What the judgment decides and what it does not decide

The actual scope of the doctrine established by the judgment must be precisely defined.

The Court establishes its criteria for cases in which the HVR are directly applicable as an international treaty, a circumstance that the ruling itself expressly states in the case under review. In this context, the normative prevalence of the international agreement determines the inapplicability of Article 286 MNA and leads to maintaining the expiry nature of the period provided for in Article 3.6 HVR.

A separate issue—which is not expressly addressed in the ruling—is that which could arise in cases where the HVR are not applicable under Article 10 of the Convention, but Spanish law governs the contract—for example, through the application of the Rome I Regulation—and the rules of the Convention operate by reference to Article 277 MNA as part of domestic law. In such a scenario, the relationship between Article 3.6 HVR and Article 286 MNA would no longer be one of the primacy of international treaty law, but rather one of interaction between domestic rules of Spanish law.

It cannot be ruled out that the Supreme Court had this hypothesis in mind when formulating its reasoning, but the fact is that it does not address it explicitly, nor does it allow us to conclude that it wished to rule on it. Consequently, it cannot be ruled out that, when directly confronted with a case in which the HVRs are applicable solely because of their incorporation into domestic law — and not as a prevailing international treaty — the Court itself could consider Article 286 MNA applicable and classify the period as subject to interruption, without this necessarily contradicting the doctrine established in this ruling.

V. Conclusion

Supreme Court Ruling 173/2026 clearly resolves the case submitted for its consideration: when international maritime transport is subject to the HVR pursuant to its own Article 10, the primacy of international treaty law excludes the applicability of Article 286 MNA as a rule capable of modifying the nature of the annual period.

However, the ruling neither confirms nor denies that this solution must necessarily be extended to all cases in which the HVR are applicable under Spanish law. Its doctrine is based precisely on the prevalence of the international agreement and on the uniform interpretation of that regime. Where this assumption does not apply — that is, when the rules operate solely as domestic law by legislative reference — the question remains open.